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Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of characteristics that 
impact total audit work performed on domestic financial statement audits. Prior 
studies have investigated the determinants of audit fees (see, e.g., Elliott and Korpi 
(1978) and Ashton, Elliott and Willingham (1989)). A more recent study by O'Keefe, 
Simunic and Stein (1994) (hereafter OSS) examines how client characteristics affect 
both the amount and mix of labor used on financial statement audits. OSS estimated 
five regression equations using as the dependent variables each of four types of labor 
input hours and total audit fees. Our study uses the same data as used by OSS-data 
from the period 1986 through 1989 for 249 clients of a large international accounting 
firm with primary operations in the manufacturing, merchandising and high tech-
nology industries. 
Our study extends the OSS and other prior studies in the following ways. OSS 
studied the determinants of total (domestic plus foreign) audit hours for four different 
personnel levels (partner, manager, senior and staff hours) and total audit fees. We 
limit our investigation to domestic audit hours for the following reasons: (1) statutory 
audit requirements may differ across jurisdictions, (2) differences in legal environ-
ments could affect the extent of audit work across jurisdictions, (3) differences in 
audit market conditions may exist across jurisdictions (e.g., fixed vs. variable fee 
markets), and (4) technology (e.g., audit processes) may differ across jurisdictions 
even within the same audit firm.1 We expect the existence of client foreign operations 
will impact the quantity of domestic audit work performed. Even though domestic 
auditors might not perform the actual audit work on foreign subsidiaries, consolida-
tion of these subsidiaries into a domestic parent's financial statements could lead to 
additional domestic audit work, especially administrative work dealing with the coor-
dination of the full audit. 
OSS estimated separate models for each of the four labor inputs mentioned above. 
We primarily focus on total domestic audit hours aggregated across all personnel 
1 For example, we know that the calculation of planning materiality for certain foreign jurisdictions differs 
from the domestic calculation for the firm whose data are being studied. This could directly affect sample 
sizes and the resulting extent of audit work performed. 
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levels. We tested (reported later) whether the four-equation modeling approach 
provided more explanatory power than the model estimated using aggregate hours and 
found no significant difference in proportion of explained variability in total audit 
hours. 
Finally, prior studies of audit production and pricing have applied the logarithmic 
transformation to both the dependent variable and the client size variable (and other 
independent variables) to linearize the relationship between client size and total audit 
hours. We tested several different functional forms of the size relationship and 
observed that both a two-equation approach (separate linear models for small and 
large clients) and a linear model using the square root of client size outperform the log 
model for our sample data. 
The remainder of the paper contains sections reporting on (1) the relationship 
between client size and audit hours, (2) the functional form of this size relationship, 
(3) the relationship between residual audit hours, after controlling for client size, and 
other engagement characteristics, and (4) multivariate models of total audit hours for 
small and large clients. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion of our 
research findings. 
Relationship Between Client Size and Total Audit Hours 
Prior studies have documented the predominance of client size as the most signifi-
cant determinant of the extent of audit work performed on financial statement audits. 
Table 1 presents details of this size relationship for our sample of 249 audit engage-
ments. In Table 1, the sample has been separated into ten equal intervals ranging from 
the smallest ten percent of the sample, as measured by total domestic assets, to the 
largest ten percent. For each interval, averages are presented for: client total domestic 
assets and total domestic sales, domestic audit hours by personnel rank and in total, 
total domestic audit hours per $1,000 of client total domestic assets, and domestic 
audit fees billed and average fee per hour.2 
Table 1 shows that total audit hours are increasing in client size, but at a decreasing 
rate. For the smallest ten percent of the sample whose average assets is $1.3 million, 
the average time required to perform audits was 257 hours. For the largest ten percent 
of the sample whose average assets is $1 billion, the average time required to perform 
the audits was 5,700 hours. On the smallest engagements, about l/5th of an hour of 
audit work is performed for each $1,000 of assets. For the largest engagements, this 
amount declines to six one-thousandths of an hour, or about 6 hours per $1 million in 
assets. The two right hand columns in Table 1 indicate that audit fees billed and 
average audit fee per hour both increase with client size. 
Table 1 also indicates that the mix of labor hours is different for small and large 
clients. For the smallest clients, partners and managers performed 25 percent of the 
total audit work, seniors 43 percent and staff 32 percent. For the largest clients, part-
ners and managers performed 17 percent of the total audit work, seniors 28 percent 
and staff 55 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the change in labor mix across the 10 size 
intervals.3 The figure reveals that, except for the smallest size interval, the proportion 
of partner and manager time remains roughly constant as size increases. The propor-
2 For the remainder of the paper, reference to "total assets" or "total audit hours" implies domestic amounts 
only. 
3 OSS document this change in labor mix and test the stability of regression model coefficients across the 
four models. We investigate differences in models by personnel rank in a later section. However, we do not 
perform direct tests of the homogeneity of coefficients. 
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tion of staff time steadily increases with size up to $100 million in assets. Based on 
discussions with auditors, this phenomenon can be explained as follows. 
Figure 1 
Relationship Between Client Size and Proportion of 
Total Domestic Audit Work Performed by Different Levels of Personnel 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Staff 
Seniors 
Managers 
Partners 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
$1.3 Million $2.6 Million $3.9 Million $6.4 Million $10.2 Million $16.4 Million $24.2 Million $40.3 Million $100.4 Million $1 Billion 
Size Intervals For Total Domestic Assets 
(Average Domestic Assets Given for Each Consecutive Size Interval Containing 10% of Total Sample) 
For small clients, most of the work performed by seniors is procedural in 
nature-tests of details and workpaper documentation. Little time is spent by seniors in 
a supervisory capacity, as the audit is too small to warrant cost-effective use of staff 
with an intermediate layer of supervision. As clients (and audits) increase in size, the 
senior's role changes to one involving more supervision and less procedural work. The 
expected result is that by employing a greater proportion of lower-cost staff and inter-
mediate supervision, profit is increased.4 
In the next section, we investigate alternative functional forms of the relationship 
between size and total audit hours. 
Functional Form of Relationship Between Client Size and 
Total Audit Hours 
Different transformations can be employed to linearize a relationship that increases 
at a decreasing rate. In this section, we evaluate models of the relationship between 
client size and audit hours using three transformations and a two-equation approach 
involving the separate linear modeling of small and large engagements. Prior studies 
have used what we wil l call the log model to estimate the nonlinear relationship 
between audit hours (or total fees) and client size.5 The log model involves taking the 
4 Auditors have expressed concern that this staff "leveraging" approach will not continue to be a profit 
increasing approach. Clients' internal audit operations continue to expand. The quality and accuracy of elec-
tronic processing of routine transactions has improved greatly over the last 20 years. As a result, large 
sophisticated clients are becoming less willing to pay for staff time involving the testing of routine transac-
tions where audit differences seldom arise. 
5 See, for example, Ashton, Elliott and Willingham (1989) and O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994). 
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natural logarithm of both the dependent variable (hours) and the independent variable 
(size), as shown in (1) below: 
ln(Hours) = α + β * 1n(Assets) (1) 
Taking the antilog of both sides of this equation shows its functional form 
expressed in terms of the original dependent variable, audit hours, i.e., 
Hours = eα * ( A s s e t s )β (2) 
When  expressed as a function of hours, instead of 1n(Hours), the log model con-
tains no intercept, and involves the multiplication f a slope (eα) times assets raised to 
the power β.6 Therefore, the log model is similar to a no-intercept model with the 
independent variable being transformed by taking its nth root.7 
We  compare the explanatory power of the log model and two other transforma-
tions-taking the square root, and the cube root, of assets and leaving the d pendent 
variable, hours, in itsoriginal form. The three functional forms, as estimated on the 
sample data using these three transformation methods, are depicted in Figure 2 along 
with a plot of the linear model.8 As shown in Figure 2, the estimated log model 
dampens to the greatest extreme. The square root and cube root models fall above the 
linear model up to a client size of about $2 illion, after which they fall below the 
linear model. The log model falls below the linear model at an asset size of about 
$600 million. 
Figure 2 
Four  Alternative Functions Estimating Relationship Between Client Size 
and Total Audit Hours 
26000 
20800 
15600 
10400 
5200 
0 
Square Root Model 
Cube Root Model 
Log Model 
0 700000 1400000 2100000 2800000 3500000 4200000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
6 The log model, as estimated using ordinary least squares regression, requires the assumption that errors 
are normally distributed, as is customary. This implies that the distribution of errors from the multiplicative 
model given in equation (2) is log normal. 
7 β>1 implies a relationship that is increasing at an increasing rate, and 0<O implies a decreasing relation-
ship. Therefore, we expect 0<β<1 if the size relationship is to increase at a decreasing rate. 
8 Sample data points have been excluded because most of the client data points would cluster near the 
y-axis in this plot. This is because a few very large clients greatly expand the plot scale. Data points are 
presented in Figures 3 through 8 where small and large segments of the overall sample are separately 
plotted together with the estimated functions. 
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In addition to the transformations described above, we estimated a covariance 
model of the size relationship－2 different linear models, one for small and the other 
for large clients. Determination of the size cutoff was made by examining various 
plots of the relationship between hours and size. We defined small clients as those 163 
clients with total assets below $25 million, with the remaining 86 clients being 
defined as large. 
Table 2 presents the model slope and the R2 measure of goodness-of-fit for the 
linear, log, square root, and cube root models estimated on the total sample of 249 
clients, and for the two-equation model separately estimated on the small and large 
samples. Models of each form are also presented for different personnel ranks. 
The R 2 for the log model is not directly comparable to the R2s for other models 
because it expresses the proportion of explained variation in the log of hours whereas 
the others express the proportion of explained variation in origi alhours. So, we 
computed a quasi-R2 for the log model by using the antilog of the right hand side of 
the estimated log model equation to estimate audit hours. Residuals were then 
computed using these estimates, and the resulting quasi-R2 was computed by: 
R 2 = 1 -(ESS/TSS) (3) 
where ESS  is the error (residual) sum of squares, or the unexplained variation in hours 
and TSS is the total variation in hours. The adjusted R2 for he two-equation model 
was calculated using the squared residuals from a full covariance model where the 
model intercept and slope on size are allowed to change for large clients.9 Sinc th s 
full covariance model contains two additional independent variables, the adjusted R2 is
presented in Table 2.10 
Table 2 shows that the two-equation model has the highest R2s, both for total audit 
hours and for the four models of total hours by personnel rank. The R2s for the linear 
model estimated on the total sample are very close to those for the two-equation 
model. The poorest model interms of proportion of explained variation in total hours 
is the log model. Although the proportion of explained variation in ln(hours) is close 
to the other models, when we compute residuals for original hours using the antilog of 
this model, the proportion of explained variation significantly diminishes. Thesquare 
root model performs equally as well as the two-equation model for manager hours, 
and almost as well for total hours and other models by personnel rank. Incidentally, 
the size exponent estimated from the log model ranges from .36 to .52,which is not 
substantially different from the squar root power of .5. Presumably, the square root 
model fits better than the log model because it allows for estimation of an intercept, 
which also changes the estimated slope coefficient. Goodness-of-fit is lower for the 
cube root model, although it still outperforms the log model. 
Figures 3 through 5 illustrate the dispersion of total audit hours around plots 
representing the linear model, the separate small and large client models, and the log 
model. Figure 3 contains the subsample of all 163 small clients. Figure 4 contains 51 
of the large clients with total assets ranging from $25 million to $100 million, and 
Figure 5 contains the remaining 35 largest clients with assets ranging from $100 
million to $4.2 billion. The plot was separated intothese three segments so that we 
could clearly depict the points representing each client. 
9 This is equivalent o using the combined sum of the squared residuals from the small and large models as 
the ESS in equation (3), with the usual adjustment for two additional independent variables to derive the 
adjusted R2. 
10 Both the dummy  variable that captures a shift in the model intercept for large clients and the slope adjust-
ment  on assets for large clients are significant in the covariance model at the .10 level. 
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Figure 3 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 163 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
1300 
1040 
780 
520 
260 
0 
Large Model 
Small Model 
Log Model 
Linear Model 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
25000 
Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
Figure 3 shows that the log model and small model follow essentially the same 
path through the center of the client data points. The log model passes through the 
origin whereas the small model has an intercept at about 264 hours. The ratio of the 
Figure 4 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 51 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Between $25 Million and $100 Million 
3200 
2400 
1600 
800 
0 
25000 40000 55000 70000 85000 100000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
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Figure 5 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 35 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Over $100 Million 
26000 
20800 
15600 
10400 
5200 
0 
Log Model 
100000 920000 1740000 2560000 3380000 4200000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
small model to log model residual sums of squares is .98 for these 163 small clients, 
which confirms that the small model minimally outperforms the log model over this 
size range. Clearly, both the linear model and the large model tend to overestimate 
hours for small clients. 
Figure 4 shows that the small model, when extended into the large client range, 
significantly overestimates total audit hours. The large model has roughly the same 
slope as the linear model, but its intercept is about 350 hours higher. The log model is 
closer to the linear model when client size is just over $25 million, and it passes 
through and closely approximates the large model toward the upper end of this range 
where size approaches $100 million in assets. The ratio of the large model to log 
model residual sums of squares is 1.14 over this range, indicating that the log model 
has a better fit over the lower range of large client sizes. 
Figure 5 shows that the log model significantly dampens at the extreme upper end 
of the range of large clients, indicating that it is not descriptive of the relationship 
between size and hours for the very largest audit clients. The linear model and the 
large model trace similar paths over this upper range for the largest clients. The ratio 
of the large model to log model residual sums of squares is .36, confirming the inferi-
ority of the log model in this upper range of size. 
Figures 3 through 5 indicate that the two-equation model and the log model are 
approximately equivalent in terms of proportion of explained variation in audit hours 
for all but the very largest clients. The two largest sample clients "swamp" the models 
in that total hours are more than twice that of any other sample client. The log model 
is the least sensitive to these two observations. In fact, the sum of the two squared 
residuals for these observations when estimated using the log model (in antilog form) 
account for 82 percent of the residual sum of squares from that model in this upper 
size range. We investigated the sensitivity of results to these two "mega-clients" by 
57 
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temporarily dropping them from the sample and recomputing the R 2s for all models. 
Both the two-equation and log models explain 69 percent of the total variation in audit 
hours for the remaining 247 clients. The linear model explains 62 percent of total vari-
ation, which is significantly lower than the two-equation and log models. The square 
root model had the best fit on this truncated sample with an R 2 = .76. 
Figure 6 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 163 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
1300 
1040 
780 
520 
260 
0 
Small Model 
Square Root Model 
— Log Model 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
Legend: Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Figures 6 though 8 illustrate the dispersion of actual total audit hours around plots 
for the separate small and large client models and the log and square root models 
when estimated on the truncated sample of 247 observations. A l l three models appear 
nearly identical for the subset of 163 small clients depicted in Figure 6. In Figure 7, 
the square root and log models appear similar for the subset of 51 clients with assets 
between $25 million and $100 million. The large model appears to slightly overesti-
mate hours within this range. For the remaining 33 large clients with assets greater 
than $100 million, the square root model depicted in Figure 8 appears to outperform 
the other two models. 
Based on the analyses presented in Table 2 and Figures 3 through 8, we make the 
following observations. First, R 2s should be cautiously interpreted when transforma-
tions are made to a dependent variable, as in the case of the log model. Reliance on 
the proportion of explained variation in the transformed dependent variable may be 
misleading. Second, the estimated two-equation model fits the relationship between 
client size and audit hours at least equally as well as the log model, and better when 
the largest clients are not truncated from the sample. Third, the square root model 
significantly outperforms both the two-equation and log models for all but the largest 
"mega-clients". 
We utilize the two-equation model for our remaining analyses of the impacts of 
other engagement characteristics on residual audit hours because it explains the 
largest proportion of total variation in the complete sample. We do not wish to exclude 
"mega-clients" from our analysis because other characteristics may explain some of 
58 
To
ta
l D
om
es
tic
 A
ud
it 
H
ou
rs
 
Figure 7 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 51 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Between $25 Million and $100 Million 
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Legend: Large Model Fit on 84 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Greater Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
their residual variance. However, we recognize that the square root model may 
provide slightly better control for the effect of client size on audit hours for the 
majority of clients in the sample. In the next section, we analyze the relationship 
between other engagement characteristics and residual audit hours after controling for 
client size using the two-equation model. 
Figure 8 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 33 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Over $100 Million 
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3100000 
Legend: Large Model Fit on 84 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Greater Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
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Relationship Between Residual Audit Hours and Other 
Engagement  Characteristics 
In order to investigate the association between characteristics other than size and 
total audit hours, we computed residuals from the two-equation size model and coded 
each residual as negative or positive for both the small and large models. Negative 
residuals indicate the size model overestimates hours and positive residuals indicate 
underestimation of hours. Next we examined the association between other engage-
ment characteristics and residual signs for the small and large clients. Significant 
associations provide preliminary indications of the existence of other characteristics 
that may help explain over- or underestimation of audit hours based on size alone. For 
example, consider two clients of approximately the same size, with one having signifi-
cant foreign operations and the other having no foreign operations. If the existence of 
foreign operations necessitates more audit work, we would expect total audit hours to 
be greater for the client with foreign operations. Assuming both of these observations 
influenced the intercept and slope of the size model, it is reasonable to expect that the 
model would overestimate hours for the clientwith only domestic operations, and 
underestimate hours for the clientwith foreign operations. 
Twenty-seven engagement characteristics were investigated in the manner 
described above－17 qualitative indicators and ten continuous measures. Table 3 
reports the association between the 17 qualitative characteristics and residual signs for 
small and large clients, and for the total sample taken as a whole. Characteristics have 
been grouped into the following categories: client complexity, client controls and 
assistance, risk characteristics11 and audit characteristics. For each qualitative charac-
teristic, Table 3 reports the proportion of clients with negative residuals exhibiting the 
characteristic, the proportion of clients with positive residuals exhibiting the charac-
teristic, and the probability for a Pearson χ2 test for significant differences in observed 
and expected frequencies. Characteristics whose proportions are significantly different 
for negative and positive residuals at the .05 level have been highlighted in Table 3. 
Table 3 indicates that qualitative client complexity measures are significantly 
correlated with residual audit hours for large clients, but not forsmall clients. A 
significantly higher proportion of large clientswith po itive residuals exhibit the exis-
tence of foreign operations, of a partially or fully decentralized accounting and 
financial control system, and of a high degree of operational complexity, as compared 
with large clients with negative residuals. For example, sixty-three percent of those 
large clients with positive residuals have a high degree of operational complexity, 
compared to only 22 percent of large clients w th negative residuals. 
Table 3 indicates that neither quality of, and extent of reliance on, client internal 
controls nor client assistance are significantly associated with residual audit hours for 
either small or large clients. However, several risk ch racteristics appear to affect total 
audit hours. A significantly greater proportion of large clientsthat are public compa-
nies have positive residuals.12 A significantly arger proportion of small clients with 
excessive employee turnover have positive residuals. A higher proportion of large 
clients with low overall inherent risk have negative residuals, and a higher proportion 
11 This paper does not investigate the issue of whether, or how, auditor business risk impacts audit fees. See 
Bell, Lansdman, and Shackelford (1994) for a detailed analysis of this related topic. 
1 2 Obviously, many of the client and audit characteristics ould be assigned to more than one category. For 
example, a public company typically is a more complex client han a private company, e.g., SEC filings 
would require additional audit work. However, we include this characteristic n the risk category for 
obvious reasons. 
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clients with low overall inherent risk have negative residuals, and a higher proportion 
of small clients with high inherent risk have positive residuals. 
Finally, Table 3 indicates that timing of the performance of audit procedures, i.e., 
whether significant interim work is performed, does not appear to significantly impact 
residual audit hours from the size models. However, a significant amount of overtime 
is spent by the engagement team on large clients with positive residuals. 
Table 4 reports means for characteristics measured on continuous scales for clients 
with negative and positive residuals, and the probability from t-test's for significant 
differences in observed means.13 Characteristics whose means are significantly 
different for negative and positive residuals at the .05 level have been highlighted. 
Table 4 indicates that none of the characteristics measured on continuous scales are 
significant for large clients. Three client complexity characteristics are significant for 
the small client subsample. These are: percentage of foreign to total assets, percentage 
of foreign to total sales, and the number of separate audit reports issued for the 
engagement. For each of these complexity measures, small clients with positive resid-
uals have significantly larger means. 
OSS test for auditor learning effects by evaluating the incremental contributions of 
a set of dummy variables capturing the tenure of the audit firm with the client. They 
find no evidence of the effect of audit firm learning on total audit hours. We supple-
ment their learning tests by investigating the tenure of current audit personnel, as 
opposed to audit firm tenure. In Table 4, we report tests for significant differences in 
the mean number of years personnel have worked on the current audit engagement for 
clients with negative and positive size-model residuals. The learning hypothesis would 
imply that audits being staffed by the same personnel for several years should take 
less time to complete, compared to audits with a less experienced engagement team. 
The section in Table 4 labeled "Audit Characteristics" reports the mean number of 
years partners, managers, and seniors have worked on the current engagement. These 
average experience measures are not significantly different for clients with negative 
and positive residuals, regardless of size, indicating that familiarity with the client's 
operations does not result in a reduction of audit hours. 
Summarizing to this point, preliminary tests for identifying engagement character-
istics impacting total audit work performed indicate that client complexity and certain 
audit risk characteristics are significantly associated with residual audit hours after 
controlling for client size. No initial evidence exists that quality of client internal 
controls, level of client assistance on the audit, or other audit characteristics (except 
overtime) significantly impact total work performed on financial statement audits. In 
the next section, we report the results of tests of multivariate models of total audit 
hours. 
Analysis of Multivariate Equations of Total Audit Hours for Small 
and Large Clients 
The analyses presented in the previous section provide a preliminary indication of 
those engagement characteristics other than client size that might provide significant 
incremental explanatory power in multivariate models of total audit hours. In this 
section, we report the results of our specification of a final model of total audit hours. 
We also investigate those engagement characteristics most significantly associated 
with the allocation of audit hours for different personnel ranks. 
1 3 Pooled within-groups standard deviations are used where warranted. 
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Table 5 reports our final multivariate models of total audit hours for small and large 
clients. We tested many combinations of engagement characteristics, including inter-
actions among characteristics, using our analyses of residual hours to guide our 
choices. However, we did not limit our search for significant incremental variables to 
those significant variables identified in the preliminary residual analysis. A l l of the 27 
engagement characteristics were given a chance to enter the final model in various 
forms. 
The large client model presented in Table 5 contains a set of client complexity 
measures, including size, and a low inherent risk indicator variable. A l l variables are 
incrementally significant at the .05 level and coefficient signs are consistent with our 
intuition. The model indicates resources are allocated to large audit engagements in 
the following manner. For each $1 million in total assets, one hour is added to total 
audit hours. Each audit report issued for a large engagement results in the addition of 
78 hours to the audit. On average, i f a large client is rated as exhibiting low inherent 
risk, total audit hours decline by 670.14 On average, if the client exhibits a high degree 
of operational complexity, 738 hours are added to the audit. Finally, for those large 
public clients with foreign operations (22 percent of our sample of 86 large clients), 
total audit hours increase by about five for each $1 million in total assets. The large 
client model explains 94 percent of the total variation in total audit hours for the 86 
large clients. 
The lower section of Table 5 reports our final model estimated on the 163 small 
clients. As with the large client model, this model contains a set of client complexity 
measures, including size, and an inherent risk indicator variable (slope adjustment on 
size for high, instead of low, inherent risk). A l l variables are incrementally significant 
at the .05 level except for total number of separate audit reports (t-test probability = 
.11), and all coefficient signs are consistent with our intuition. The model indicates 
resources are allocated to small audit engagements in the following manner. For each 
$1 million in total assets, 23 hours are added to total audit hours. Each audit report 
issued for small engagements results in the addition of 16 hours to the audit. On 
average, if a small client is a public company, total audit hours increase by 119. For 
each percentage point of foreign sales to total sales, audit hours increase by nine. 
Finally, for those small public clients with high inherent risk, total audit hours 
increase by about 21 for each $1 million in total assets. The model explains 54 percent 
of the total variation in total audit hours for the 163 small clients.15 
1 4 Dummy variables that shift the model intercept capture "average" effects on hours for the entire subset of 
clients exhibiting the characteristic. In reality, the effect would likely vary across engagements depending 
on the size of the client and the existence of other engagement characteristics. For some characteristics our 
model only includes a term that captures the intercept shift because additional variables that attempt to 
capture related slope changes were not statistically significant. 
15 Table 5 indicates that the large model explains a much higher proportion of total variation in hours for the 
86 large clients as compared to the proportion of total variation explained with the small model for the 163 
small clients. We can only guess as to why this is true. One explanation is that the two "mega-clients" 
discussed in an earlier section contribute a large proportion of the total variation in hours for large clients, 
and influence model fit to the extent that much of this variation is explained. We dropped the two largest 
clients from the large sample and re-estimated the final large model. The R 2 dropped to .79, still signifi-
cantly higher than for the small model. Based on discussions with auditors, we suspect the principal cause 
for higher unexplained variability in hours on small clients relates to the high degree of variability in the 
quality of the accounting support function within small clients. Some small clients have implemented high 
quality reporting systems, and others have not. For those clients who have poor systems or none at all, a 
large portion of the total audit work involves accounting work. This characteristic is virtually nonexistent 
for large clients. 
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The R 2 for the full two-equation model is .95 (adjusted R 2 = .94).16 If we delete the 
two "mega-clients" from the large sample, the R 2 for the full two-equation model 
drops to .84 (adjusted R 2 = .84), but the coefficient signs and significance levels are 
unaffected. We also estimated the full two-equation model using the square root of 
assets as the client size measure. The R 2 for this model (not shown is Table 5) is .89 
when estimated on the full sample of 249 clients, and .88 when estimated on the trun-
cated sample of 247 clients. These results indicate that the two-equation model with 
total assets used as the client size variable performs slightly better than the two-equa-
tion square root model for the full sample of 249 clients, but the two-equation square 
root model performs slightly better on the truncated sample of 247 clients. 
Table 5 also reports the t-statistics for coefficients in separate models of partner, 
manager, senior and staff hours. Client size for those large clients that are not public 
companies with foreign operations is not significant in determining the allocation of 
partner, manager and senior hours. Size most significantly impacts the allocation of 
staff hours for large clients. The same phenomenon exists for the low inherent risk 
characteristic for large engagements-staff hours are the only hours that are signifi-
cantly reduced. Partner, manager, and senior hours are significantly increased by the 
total number of separate audit reports, but staff hours are not significantly affected by 
this characteristic. For large clients with a high degree of operational complexity, allo-
cations of hours for all four personnel ranks are significantly positively impacted, but 
for seniors only marginally (t-test probability for seniors = .06). Allocations of hours 
for all personnel ranks is significantly impacted by size for those large public clients 
with foreign operations. 
For small clients, Table 5 indicates that allocations of hours for all personnel ranks 
are significantly impacted by client size. The total number of separate audit reports 
does not significantly impact allocations of hours for any rank of personnel. Sixty-
nine percent of the sample of 163 small clients have only one audit report, whereas 74 
percent of the large clients have more than one audit report. We included the variable 
in the small client models because it was marginally significant for the total hours 
model (p = .11) and because the preliminary analysis of residual hours (reported 
above) indicated significance. Partner and manager hours are significantly higher for 
publicly traded small companies, but allocations of senior and staff time are not 
significantly impacted by this characteristic. For each percentage point of foreign 
sales to total sales, audit hours for partners, managers and seniors are significantly 
increased, but not for staff. Finally, allocations of hours for managers and staff are 
significantly impacted by client size for those small clients with high inherent risk, but 
not allocations of hours for partners and seniors. 
In order to investigate whether the use of separate models by personnel rank might 
explain more of the variation in total audit hours, we estimated total hours using these 
separate models for small and large clients, and computed the proportion of total vari-
ation in total audit hours explained by the aggregate estimates. Estimated hours for 
each personnel rank were first summed for each sample client, yielding an estimate of 
total audit hours. Residuals were then computed by subtracting these estimates from 
actual hours. The squared residuals were then summed and the R 2 for total audit hours 
was computed using equation (3) given above. As indicated in Table 5, this R 2 is .95 
and is not significantly different from the R 2 resulting from application of the total 
hours model without concern for personnel ranks. In fact, the residual sums of squares 
for both approaches are almost identical. 
See footnote 9. 
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Summary 
In this study, we investigated the association between many audit engagement 
characteristics and quantity of work performed on domestic financial statement audits 
to better understand the determinants of audit resource allocations. We observed that 
for a sample of 249 manufacturing, merchandising, and high technology clients, 
different characteristics appear to impact quantity of audit work performed for small 
and large engagements. For small engagements with total assets up to $25 million, 
client size, ownership status, the percentage of foreign to total sales, and whether the 
client exhibits high inherent risk appear to significantly impact the quantity of work. 
For large engagements with total assets over $25 million, client size, the total number 
of audit reports, a high degree of operational complexity, whether the client exhibits 
low inherent risk, and whether the client is a public company with foreign operations 
appear to significantly impact the quantity of work. 
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